CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 160

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It was also argued that whatever the decision might be on an announce- nont of our intention to withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore by 1975-76,

we could not hope to secure even the acquiescence of our allies in this

policy unless we were prepared to commit ourselves to maintaining a

continuing capability for military action in the Far East thereafter.

Wo need not decide at this stage whether or not the maintenance of that

capability entailed stationing military forces in the area, though there

night be advantages in terms of public presentation in describing the

policy as one of maintaining a continuing military presence in the Far East. The use of facilities in Australia, even if this was acceptable to the Australian Government, would entail certain military penalties

because these facilities were so distant from the mainland of Asia and

might also entail capital expenditure to which we should have to contribute,

The major cost of our present form of military presence in the Far East

arose from the maintenance of the extensive bases and stockpiles in

Singapore and Malaysia. If we were to abandon these facilities, and renove

the stocks, it might nevertheless be possible for our forces to continue

to use facilities in Singapore e.g. the present dockyard night then be

converted to a civil dockyard which could be used for refits on a

commercial basis by our naval forces and we could use airfields

maintained by the Singapore Government. While it would be necessary for

sone United Kingdom forces to be visible in South East Asia, if we were

to gain full political advantage fron the maintenance of our nilitary

capability for action in this area, this visible presence could well be maintained by the rotation of naritine air forces (and perhaps by retaining the Gurkhas) using facilities in Singapore despite the fact that we would

have given up the present base. The absence of stockpiles would mean a

delay of some three months in our capacity to carry out sustained military action. We should have to consider if this was acceptable.

AND

In further discussion it was suggested that the political advantage

of our maintaining a military presence in the Far East, might be met in

part by basing Polaris submarines East of Suez, provided this course were

acceptable to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. On

the other hand, it was argued that Polaris submarines were irrelevant to the military and political requirements which our continuing presence in

the Far East would be designed to meet and that the maintenance of

conventional forces would be of much greater importance to our allies.

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